Tor compromised

It has long been known that much of the resources for Tor are provided by US spy agencies. Which is not necessarily a bad thing, since they might want a means for communicating that no one can spy on.

However, Lucky Green, a key figure in the privacy community, has issued a warrant canary – what you issue when you are forbidden to tell people you have had a warrant served on you.

The canary fails to tell us that a US spy agency is inside his servers in a way that tells us that a US spy agency now is inside his servers and a many other Tor servers.

In a warrant canary, you say what you are forbidden to say by failing to say things that you would otherwise be expected to say.

This inclines me to Moldbug’s solution, assuming his interpreter and compiler can be sufficiently small and self contained that one can make sure that everyone runs the same one. But if the interpreter and compiler exceed sixteen thousand lines, then defending them against this sort of attack becomes difficult.