Sex and natural law

As to the matter of approving crime in an isolated case, my point was that we do not approve of crime in an isolated case simply because it is isolated. The examples you raise are tolerable not because they are isolated, per se, but because their extraordinary circumstances justify the action and lead to them being more or less isolated events only circumstantially.

Aquinas’ methodology can be difficult to understand and requires extensive, prior, philosophical preparation. I truly mean no offense in pointing out what seem to me to be mistakes, because all of us, myself included, have a steep learning curve before approaching Aquinas. As a case in point, in two of the citations you gave from Aquinas, you cited his words as though they were propositions with which he concurred – apparently not realizing that you cited from the section of “objections,” which always form the first part of his examinations in the Summa, and which are points he intends to refute or disqualify as erroneous or logically irrelevant to the point at hand. Your first citation of Aquinas (ending “therefore, the Natural Law is not an act, but an habit”), was ‘objection 3,’ and is a point he immediately goes on to refute, saying “Augustine’s teaching is contrary to this,” concluding “therefore, the natural law is NOT an habit.” After stating his view and the reason for it, he gives his detailed response to objection 3: “that argument leads to the conclusion that man holds to the Natural Law by means of habit, and this we concede.” I.e., Aquinas’ teaching is that Natrual Law is NOT an habit, but he concedes that man holds to it by an habitual action.

As you go on, citing article 5, I would say that you come to the heart of the point. Aquinas says the natural law is that, towards which nature inclines (or which nature does not oppose). This is exactly what we’re discussing. What is “nature,” insofar as man is concerned? Aquinas conceded that certain states of man – nakedness, common possession of property, etc. – could be taken as natural and a part of Natural Law, and you cited him to this effect. But I don’t know why you ignored what immediately follows, since that is what is really germane to our discussion. He continued to give examples of things pertaining to Natural Law: “now slavery, and the distinction of possessions, were not introduced by nature, but were devised by human reason for the benefit of human life.” These are also examples of Natural Law, because, though nature did not introduce them, human reason introduced them in order to facilitate man in attaining to his natural end, in a manner that was not contrary to nature. We are now getting close to what I was saying about Patriarchy and civilization, namely, how all the considerations you raise abous sex, marriage and society, are, from the Catholic (and Aristotelian) perspective, elements precisely and integrally of Natural Law. We’ve seen that Aquinas views Natural Law as involving that to which nature inclines, or to which nature has not introduced the contrary. What would Aquinas say about the morally tricky parts we’re discussing? What is “nature?” What is “natural” when it comes to sex, patriarchy, etc.? Let’s start with Aquinas’ view of the natural good of man.

“I answer that, As stated above (LXXXV Art. 1), the good of (human) nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely.” (LXXXV, Art.2)

In other words, Aquinas sees the chief good of human nature to be acting viruously as a rational creature. He would agree that nature inclines towards certain ends (like seeking nourishment, procreation, safety, etc.), and would agree that pursuing these ends, which nature introduced, in a manner not contrary to nature, would be rational and virtuous. But what happens in the tricky questions? How might a man pursue these things in an unnatural way? Nature inclines man to procreate and to see to his own safety and comfort; but if man is a rational creature and this is the good of his nature, why does he seem to have a “natural” tendency to pursue these natural inclinations in ways that fall short of his natural good? Why does the Natural Law seem to go astray, here? What does the diminution of man’s natural good through evil look like, relative to Natural Law? He says:

“I answer that, As stated above (XC, Art. 4,5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men’s hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of particular actions, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Question 77, Article 2). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Romans 1), were not esteemed sinful.” (XC, Art. 6)

When we examine this alongside your last point, the matter will be perfectly clear. You cite Aquinas as saying that “the Natural Law needs no promulgation,” but you were again citing from the section of errors which Aquinas intends to refute. His refutation is as follows: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc ipso quod Deus eam mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam” (“to the first argument one must say that the promulgation of the Natural Law comes from this very fact: that God placed it in the minds of men as something which they should naturally lean through diligent inquiry”). I cite the Latin, because many English translations have lazily translated the term “cognoscendam” as simply “known”, but the real meaning of this term (“something to be discovered through inquiry”) strikes to the very heart of the matter under discussion. Lewis and Short, the scholar’s standard Latin-English dictionary (alongside Oxford’s), defines cognosco as: “to become thorougly acquainted with, to learn by inquiring, to examine, investigate, perceive, see, understand, learn, to come to know.” The Natural Law is not something that man simply “knows,” especially not instinctively; Aquinas uses the verb cognosco advisedly, here, because he understands that the Natural Law is something indeed written on the heart of man, but something which man is likely to ignore or misunderstand if he simply runs on instinct without a diligent attempt to study, inquire and learn about the full implications of Natural Law in a deliberate way, with a consequent effort to hold to the Natural Law habitually through good customs, laws, virtue, etc. Indeed, the quest to do so is part of man’s natural good – defined by Aquinas, as we have seen, as “the inclination to virtue, proper to man as a rational being.”

All of which goes to demonstrate my point: generally, Natural Law is not concerned with what “comes naturally” and instinctually, since this is often corrupted by what is unnatural – evil, concupiscence, passions, bad customs, etc. It is concerned, rather, with the rational end of man’s authentic nature, which is to act rationally and virtuously; the rational control of man’s natural inclinations, through patriarchy, law, custom, etc., is thus inherent to Natural Law. The Church does not “promulgate” Natural Law by having “the cardinals” put out some edict or other; rather, acknowledging that Natural Law must be learnt through diligent inquiry, with an effort to overcome the blinding of our reason through passions and vice, the Church applies the full power of human reason to what it can know of God’s creation, and avails herself of the infallibility on faith and morals, with which God wished to endow His Church, to give sure instruction on the Natural Law to all men, and the faithful in particular. When “the cardinals” issue an authoritative teaching on Natural Law, they are not “promulgating” it. They are simply declaring what has been discovered from the Natural Law through human reason, enlightened by grace, with more or less moral certainty. Of course people, especially when customs become corrupted and vice reigns, are going to have inclinations that incline them NOT to agree with the philosophical and moral truths of Natural Law. That doesn’t mean the Church is “doing it wrong,” when she recalls the people to them in spite of their superficially contrary consensus.

And, lest it go unsaid, a large part of what I’m saying, is that the Church agrees with you: the rite of marriage has always acknowledged that the women are under authority (we may not say “owned,” as property, but certainly they are completely governed by their fathers/husbands, almost exactly as children). The nuptial blessing, following immediately upon the embolism in the Mass, dwells almost entirely upon the wife, emphasizing again and again that she must be loyal to her husband, must cleave only to him, must flee from illicit unions with other men, must raise up offspring to her husband, must know no other man’s bed or couch, etc., etc. The bride is given away, the consent of the father is required, every element of the service acknowledges that the woman is not in charge of herself. The Church has always upheld Patriarchy, the absolute subordination of women to the authority of the men in their lives, as essential to Natural Law and a just society.

You say that the Church is “doing it wrong” if it needs to express teaching on contraception, with which people do not agree. Do you think everybody agrees that women should be subjected to their husbands and treated as property? If not, why would you feel that you are doing it right? Surely you acknowledge that people, and societies, can often go astray and fall from an understanding and a consent to what is right… and that moral authority must be imposed contrary, in many cases, to the superficial will of the masses?

“If the church needs to express teaching on contraception, then its teaching on contraception is not natural law.”

If someone needs to be taught the laws of physics, they aren’t the laws of physics.

A baseball pitcher can intuit Newton’s laws after a fashion, but he doesn’t understand Newton’s laws as well as the collective knowledge of a community which can land men on the moon.

Your view through the lens of radical modernist individualism leads you into a constant battle with straw men.

“A baseball pitcher will hit the target better than Newton.”

You are changing the subject and hoping nobody will notice. The subject is the epistemic grounds of knowledge of physics and morality (natural law).

But go ahead, burn effigies for the children.

Burn, straw man, burn!

Whether Bohr and Einstein and Newton agree, or if all of them are wrong for that matter, is just as irrelevant. Who is an expert in natural law or physics or history or math or biology is just another red herring. Whether I or the Church or Aristotle are right or wrong about natural law is a distinct issue from what kind of thing the natural law is.

Your claim is that the natural law has to be something perspicuous to everyone or it isn’t natural law. That’s not what “natural law” actually means to the people you pretend to disagree with though (Aristotle, the Church, your own commenters, etc).

It actually is possible to learn quantum mechanics, calculus, and natural law (among other subjects); especially when you are willing to learn from people who know what they are talking about. That a particular subject is not perspicuous to you is not a characteristic of the subject matter: it is a characteristic of you.

“You are responding as if natural law is not natural law, but divine law.”

No I’m not. Your claim was that if it isn’t perspicuous, it isn’t natural law. (Perhaps you are backing down on that claim now?)

But that is as ridiculous as saying that if it isn’t perspicuous it isn’t the laws of physics.

The fact that you don’t properly understand the laws of physics, and that authorities like (e.g.) the physics community do, doesn’t change the nature of the laws of physics. The fact that you don’t properly understand the natural law, and that the Church does, doesn’t change the nature of the natural law. The fact that nobody can teach you the laws of physics in a combox, and that you won’t properly understand them unless you learn from authorities on the subject, doesn’t validate your epistemic question-begging.

Obviously, we disagree that the Church will be as apt as anyone else to conclude incorrectly on matters of Natural Law. I have confidence that the Church – when infallibility is engaged – has never erred and will never err on moral teaching. I believe that this is the unambiguous teaching of the Scriptures, not to mention Reason and Tradition. I would also take the opportunity to point out that, if we grant for argument’s sake that the Church could issue an infallible statement on morality, it would still not follow that the Natural Law is promulgated by an edict of God through the Church. All the Church is doing in such an edict, is acting like an infallible “Supreme Court,” knowing certainly what the Law means, but not in any way promulgating the Law itself. The Church’s teaching on a point of Natural Law does not say “to understand Divine Law, you have to be a Catholic and believe our decrees.” Rather, it says, “Reason alone is capable of approving the truthfulness of these moral positions, and other, non-Catholic societies have often embraced them; but because men naturally acknowledge their private capacity for error in reasoning, we place the Church’s full authority behind this exposition of the Natural Law so that all doubt in the matter may be removed for the faithful.”

You mention contraception, and I think it’s a fine example. Despite not being Catholic, your intuition hits on all the points that the Fathers and Doctors discuss. Yes, estrus is cryptic and the Church has always acknowledged that the marital embrace also serves as a mutual support to the spouses (in fostering affection and bonding), and as a curb to fornication, and that these are legitimate goods of coitus. But the Church has always perceived that coitus does not so much have “three ends,” as one end to which all the composite parts are naturally tied. The unitive bond of the spouses, and their eschewing of adultery, is chiefly summated and entirely expressed in conceiving and rearing legitimate offspring – the literal fruit of union and ward of fidelity. Therefore every (natural) sex act is oriented towards this in principle, even if not every sex act leads to conception. Even traditional Buddhism and the Dalai Lama condemn contraception; it is only passion, vice and evil custom that has occluded this truth of the Natural Law in our society.

You said, “if natural law is accessible to reason, then decent people will generally get it right.” I agree and disagree, depending upon what we mean by “decent.” My family members, with one exception, are basically “decent” people who are not aggressively left wing; yet they all approve of gay marriage, no fault divorce, abortion, “egalitarianism,” etc. They do this because their good intentions exist in a vacuum, divorced from the good habits, good laws and moral knowledge that were once commonplace in our society. But “decent” is from the Latin for “suitable, fitting appropriate.” If Natural Law is discoverable through reason and is held to by virtuous habit (as Aquinas puts it), or is apprehended by “phronesis” (prudence/practical wisdom) after acquiring knowledge and practice in the virtues (as Aristotle puts it), then “decent” people, for purposes of Natural Law, are only such people as are earnestly endeavouring to do this.

People may have difficulty in discovering and understanding every element of the Natural Law; since a proper understanding of it comes through careful, reasoned inquiry by those practicing the virtues, we should not have the expectation that people will generally “get it right,” especially in an age where education and virtue are corrupted by vice, bad habit and wicked law as a matter of course (as at present). The Catholic Church is neither “promulgating” Natural Law, nor making it a matter of Divine Law, when She offers infallible interpretations of Natural Law to the faithful. As an aside, “Divine Law” refers to precepts contained in the deposit of revelation, and Catholic theologians admit that Christ’s direct revelation added no new, merely moral precept to the Natural Law (see http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09071a.htm), though it is true that the Church’s authoritative exposition of a point of moral revelation obliges a Catholic to believe it not merely as something reasonably deduced from Natural Law, but as something “de fide divina et ecclesiastica” (“of divine and ecclesiastical faith”). I would therefore disagree, respectfully, with you assertion that an authoritative, ecclesiastical interpretation of morality makes it a matter of Divine Law. It may make it a matter of Divine (and Ecclesiastical) Faith, but the categories of law have to do with the nature of their original promulgation, not the Church’s theological certainty of individual precepts.

Most importantly, I would point out that your objection – i.e., that if Catholics have to explain, define and decree something over the disagreement of others, it must not really be Natural Law – runs contrary to the notion of Natural Law as held by any of its authoritative expositors. In fact, it implicates you in some contradictions and views, with which I know you don’t (and can’t, all simultaenously) agree. On the one hand, you cite opposition to aggression as an example of Natural Law, since decent people generally agree to oppose it. Yet you regard some of the more complex trappings of society as not coming from Natural Law, though you seem to find it reasonably evident that promiscuity, absentee fathers, etc., create imminent threats which people should perceive and resist at least as strongly. On the one hand, you explicitly state in regards to marriage, what is implicit in the rest of your argument – i.e., that because nature doesn’t commend these things to us, forcing them without consent (or “forcefully manipulated consent”) is “the best” system; yet, on the other hand, you speak of Patiarchy and the societal trappings for controlling sex as reasonable and good… so, if you are any kind of traditional, conservative, (neo)reactionary man, I would think that you would feel that you had reason on your side in this case, and could reasonably expect to convince decent men of your view (making them a part of Natural Law). I could elaborate some more, but I think my gist is becoming clear.

For my part, I think the sanest view, is that Natural Law is derived objectively from authentic nature, but that, due to natural limitations and unnatural defects at present, men have to make a positive effort to strive beyond vaguely correct intuitions and instincts to arrive at anything like an exact knowledge of its precepts. Patriarchy and the trappings of an advanced society are precisely the result of a more refined understanding of Natural Law, not an arbitrary situation arising from socially constructed circumstances that aim at some other end than is natural to man. We want to uphold the naturalness and the reasonableness of Patriarchy and civilization, precisely because we do expect to convince decent people of them (rather than imposing them either as our whimsy, or as the edicts of a race of demi-gods arranging the lives of the masses for them), and thus we want to affirm, clearly, that they flow from Natural Law. We want to uphold, as well, that because Natural Law deals with us at our best, it requires us to strive to be our best, if we hope to study and understand it. The apex of this ideal is attained in the Church, transcending nature with supernatural gifts of infallibility willed by God for our necessary benefit. The Church’s authoritative recognition or explanation of what is revealed, is something very different from Divine Revelation itself, and I think this is easy to see. In response to your conclusion that “whatever Thomas is doing, he is not abolishing the category of natural law,” I can only say that I agree, but that your own conception of the essence of Natural Law seems problematically vague, and is certainly different from the general understanding of it, especially by its authoritative expositors.

I enjoy the discussion of the more important, controversial issues, and think (Neo)Reactionary men benefit from having them. I believe I have expressed my disagreement respectfully; but if you truly feel that our conversation is nothing more than pages of “schoolyard abuse,” tell me and I’ll quit discussing it. Show me where I’ve abused you, and I’ll also give you the due apology.

I wasn’t aware that you were waiting for me to posit an argument based on the natural end of sexual intercourse. I was arguing a completely different point. You were saying that if a point of morality requires detailed explanation, it isn’t really Natural Law; you spoke disapprovingly of “the cardinals” promulgating Natural Law “by edict,” and indicated that, because “what is natural depends a lot on socially constructed circumstances, there is no natural law on sex.” But you then went on to say, contradictorily, that “natural law is those restraints that are natural to impose on feral behavior,” while asserting that a society that placed restrictions on feral behaviour to attain “strong families, and little or no welfare for bastards” is “not a necessary product of natural law,” and that force and manipulation must constrain the “contract” of marriage, even if it nullifies the Natural Law of contract, in the interests of fidelity to kin and patriarchs… even if this whole train of reasoning has undermined any rational, moral basis for valuing such things as loyalty and duty.

I was not attempting to furnish you with a description of Natural Law on contraception. I was taking pains to refute all this, and to demonstrate that your description of Natural Law is almost the reverse of the real philosophy of Natural Law, and is in fact quite Letist, blending elements of the Nitzschean ubermensch and the critical theory typical of Social Marxism. It breaks from the philosophy of Natural Law on the very first point (i.e., on the definition of Nature). It’s a problem I sometimes see with the more cynical, atheistic or pagan elements of Neoreaction – their philosophical premises remain those of the liberal revolution (i.e., relativism), even if they have agreed that counter-revolutionary ends are more desirable and practical for society, and hence, since every philosophy is a fiction, the ethno-patriarchal fiction is to be preferred (and the theonomic tradition more or less tolerated) as the best means to the aforementioned, merely pragmatic, counter-revolutionary ends. It is important that the religious rubes be sincere in believing their fiction, but we, the enlightened, embrace the society their folly produces from a superior vantage point – knowing that it is a lie, albeit the lie that produces a more pleasant society than the alternatives, all things considered.

I would point out that the argument from authority is not always a logical fallacy; in fact, authority is the only rational grounds for the existence of morality, and any argument of “good” or “bad,” “ought” or “ought not,” is going to take us to the First Cause in very short order (because there are no intermediate causes in the matter). That said, my discussion of the Catholic Church’s authority was designed to show that the Catholic Church has no authority to promulgate Natural Law, and thus she advances no teaching on Natural Law as though it were true only because she has made it to be so.

Still, if you wanted to talk about contraception, from reason rather than (mere) authority, I happily would have obliged the request. I strongly disagree with your assertion that a couple has “an obligation to continue having sex with each other ‘for the sake of the children’ – which is to say, for the sake of the existing and planned future children, which is to say, for both the immediate telos of the sexual act, the unitive bond, and the final telos of the sexual act, the reproduction that they united for.”

When a person is taking direct, artificial steps, with the express intention of impeding a natural, biological result of intercourse, it should be obvious to any thinking person that they are hardly respecting either the “immediate telos” or the “final telos” of the sexual act. They are making a deliberate effort to prevent it! It is like saying that a man who interrupts his dinner two or three times in order to induce vomiting), so that he can make room to eat as much of his wife’s cooking as possible, is respecting the “telos” of eating dinner simply because his actions nevertheless help his wife feel appreciated for her wifely labors. The end of marriage and the end of intercourse are related, yet not the same thing, even as the end of marriage and the end of appreciatively eating your wife’s dinner are related, yet not the same thing.

Marriage can be real, even without or before children (couples having problems conceiving), and even without sex (couples dealing with impotence or old age, or saintly couples leading the ascetic life). When sex is employed, the telos of intercourse must be observed ALONG WITH that of marriage; the telos of marriage does not justify making a deliberate effort to impede the telos of intercourse. I know that not every roll in the hay results in a conception. Neither does every hunting trip result in a catch, but this does not mean that one is entitled to kill animals in a wasteful way, simply because there are other goods of hunting (practicing skills, male bonding, etc.). In both cases, one is even free to intend one of the lesser goods primarily, provided this intent is not exclusionary of the chief good and telos of the act. It’s like I tell people when they think human rights are in conflict: if you have found conflicting rights, you can be sure that at least one of them is not really a right. If you think you’ve found a conflict between the telos of sex and the telos of marriage, such that one must be sacrificed to attain the other, you’ve made a mistake. Mankind, marriage and sex all have natural ends; nature has not set nature against itself, any more than righteousness has set rights against themselves.

Western Civilization has been twisted by long years of relativism, solipsism, narcissism and hedonism, such that restricting the spermicides, the whips and nipple clamps, the instant gratification, etc., to marriage, seems like a great feat of morality. It is unsurprising, therefore, that people find “the Catholic Church’s” position on contraception to be outrageous and peculiar. But, go read “Beyond Dogma” by the Dalai Lama, a book which has deeply upset scores of patchouli-scented Leftists by demonstrating Buddhism’s profound agreement with the Catholic Church on many points of morality. In fact, there is a scholar in the fields of Buddhism and Bioethics named Damien Keown. In his book, “Buddhist Ethics: a Very Short Introduction,” he concludes thusly in his fourth chapter (on Buddhist sexuality): “Buddhist teachings on sexual ethics are by no means clearly formulated, but do appear to express the following ideals: 1) celibacy is preferrable to marriage; 2) for those who marry, the only legitimate forms of sexual conduct, are those that are procreative in nature. We also noted a close and unexpected resemblance between Tibetan Buddhist and traditional Christian teachings on sexual ethics. Certain of the Dalai Lama’s pronouncements could almost have been issued by the Vatican, and his views on abortion and euthanasia also closely resemble Catholic teachings.”

The position is not one that could only stand by appeals to Catholic “authority,” and is in fact not uniquely Catholic. All the bluster about the Catholic position being “indefensible” and irrational seems itself to smack of prejudice; I find the Catholic position reasonable and eminently defensible, which is part of the reason I converted to the Catholic Church.

Well, either because we’re too far into the weeds, or because one or both of us are assholes, we seem to be miscommunicating rather fiercely. For what it’s worth, I was not trying to caricature your views; I had honestly gotten the impression that this was what you were trying to convey, and I did not mean anything insulting by my summation of your points. As to the bit about the importance of the religious rubes believing their shtick while more enlightened Neoreactionaries tolerate it for pragmatic reasons, I derived this opinion only somewhat from what you said here, but mostly from other places where you have expressed your views on religion, which include such quotes as:

“I am a cynical materialist who values religion for utilitarian and civilization building reasons, but the Church should not be, and cannot be, cynical materialists. Fortunately hypocrisy dies out in a single generation, because the next generation does not get the joke.”

I will admit that my “no thinking person” was somewhat abusive, as it is a back-handed compliment. It communicates the thought that “surely you must realize this, since I know you are a thinking person, and therefore I suspect that you are resorting to mere rhetoric for the sake of winning an argument.” I believe that is what you were doing, so I don’t know if it’s right to apologize for having the thought. But, certainly it is churlish to speak so indirectly: the better thing to do, would have been to either say so directly or, if I thought there was no point in doing it, to simply discontinue the argument. So, I will apologize for dealing unmanfully with you, there.

I imagine we should just leave it at that; we’re talking past each other, at this point.